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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
GEORGE RUPP, et al., ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
GRANTSVILLE CITY, et al., ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
CASE NO. 16270 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Grantsville City, et al. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellants filed an action seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of Revised Ordinances 
of Grantsville City, Chapter 22, Sections 31, 34 and 35 and 
Chapter 28, Sections 13, 15 and 27. The Appellants alleged 
that City officials had misrepresented to them and other 
citizens certain facts with respect to a bond election which 
approved the issuance of general obligation bonds to help 
pay the costs of constructing a sewer system in Grantsville. 
The Appellants alleged that they relied upon these misrepresenta-
tions in supporting the bond election and that the enforcement 
of the cited ordinances was contrary to the representations 
made and denied them their rights of due process and the 
opportunity to vote at an election fairly presented and also 
-1-
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constituted a confiscation of their property without 
compensation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Tooele County with the Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding. After all the evidence 
was presented and having allowed time for counsel to submit 
memorandums, the Court granted the Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss which it had taken under advisement at the conclusion 
of Appellants' case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek to have the findings of the trial 
court and its order based thereon upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to November 3, 1970, the elected officials of 
Grantsville City determined it to be in the best interests 
of the citizens of Grantsville City to construct a municipal 
sewer system. Application was made for Federal grants to 
help defray the costs of construction. As a condition 
precedent to receiving the Federal grants, it was necessary 
for the City to adopt a mandatory connection ordinance. 
This ordinance (Exhibit P-2) was adopted in 1969. The water 
ordinance (Exhibit P-1) was adopted in 1955. The Federal 
grants were obtained and the City called a special bond 
election, which was held on November 3, 1970, in which the 
voters approved the issuance of the bonds to help find the 
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I 
_I. 
I 
construction and maintenance of the sewer system. Prior to 
the bond election, the elected officials of Grantsville City 
circulated a flyer (Exhibit P-3) in support of the bond 
election. Bids were let and awarded to various contractors, 
and construction of the sewer system began. After construction 
was commenced, it was discovered that the consulting engineers 
who designed the system had made a mistake with respect to 
the number of lineal feet of sewer laterals for the sewer 
system. It was discovered that the actual number of lineal 
feet of sewer laterals needed would be 24,000 feet rather 
than the 6,000 feet originally anticipated. To solve the 
problem of paying for the additional footage of sewer laterals, 
the elected officials of the City determined to increase the 
connection fee to the sewer system from $250.00 to $350.00. 
Letters were sent from the City advising citizens of the 
mistake, and a public meeting to discuss the proposed solution 
was advertised and held. The public meeting was well attended 
and a vote was taken on the proposed solution, which was 
approved with only a few objections. The City then increased 
the connection fee from $250.00 to $350.00. Construction of 
the sewer was completed and the citizens were advised that 
connection to the system was available on December 4, 1972. 
Letters were sent to the citizens (Exhibit D-5) relative to 
the sewer system and payment of the connection fees. Appellants 
failed to pay the connection fee; and pursuant to the ordinance, 
water service to their residences was discontinued. Upon 
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payment of the connection fee, water service was reinstated. 
Each of the Appellants had made payment of the connection 
fee, without paying tmder protest, by May 11, 1976. On 
September 1, 1977 the Appellants filed suit seeking declaratory 
injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of Revised 
Ordinances of Grantsville, Chapter 22, Sections 31, 34 and 
35 and Chapter 28, Sections 13, 15 and 26 and, also, seeking 
an injunction to prevent the City from raising the connection 
fee above $250.00 as against the Appellants. The suit was 
filed without making a claim against the City for refund of 
the $100.00 collected over and above the $250.00 original 
connection fee and without complying, in any way, with the 
Governmental II!lI!lunity Act or with Utah Code Annotated, Title 
10, Chapter 7, Section 77. 
The Appellants alleged that on or about November 4, 
1970 the City presented to the citizens a proposal for the 
ftmding, construction and maintenance of a sewer system to 
serve the City. They alleged that the elected representatives 
of the City made certain specific representations to the 
Appellants, both orally and written, that the Appellants 
relied upon the representations in supporting the bond 
election. They alleged that subsequent to the approval of 
the bond issue, the City has sought to enforce the above-
mentioned ordinances, including the increased connection fee, 
all of which they alleged was contrary to the representations 
made to the residents. The Appellants alleged that enforcement 
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of the ordinances had been arbitrary and discriminatory, 
violating their rights to equal protection and due process. 
They alleged that enforcement of the ordinances, which was 
in direct contradiction to the representations made prior to 
the bond election, denied them due process, constituted a 
confiscation of plaintiffs' property without compensation, 
without notice, without a fair opportunity to be heard, and 
without the opportunity to vote at a duly called election on 
issues fairly presented to the residents. They alleged that 
as a result of their failure to connect to the sewer system, 
the City caused their water service to be discontinued and 
that the enforcement of the ordinances would cause the 
plaintiffs undue hardship and irreparable harm. The defendant, 
City then filed an answer and the case was brought to trial 
on December 15, 1978, after having been continued on October 30, 
1978. Some evidence was stipulated to and the plaintiffs 
called one witness and the defendants called two witnesses. 
On October 30, 1978 and December 15, 1978, the plaintiffs 
stipulated that the adequacy of the design of the sewer 
system would not be an issue at the trial and it was not 
raised as an issue. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' 
evidence, the defendant, City moved to dismiss the action on 
three basis: First, that the thrust of the plaintiffs' 
action was that the defendant, City had made misrepresentations 
of certain facts and the plaintiffs' evidence did not show 
that they relied upon any of the purported misrepresentations. 
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Second, that the case sounded in tort and deceit and based 
upon the evidence presented that was in fact the thrust of 
the action and that the City had not had its governmental 
inununity waived as to such a case. Third, that the evidence 
did not establish that the payments made by the plaintiffs 
were paid under protest. 
The Court took the motion under advisement and it gave 
counsel time to submit memorandums and the defendant, City 
then presented its case. At the conclusion of all the 
evidence and after the time had run for the memorandums of 
counsel to be submitted, the Court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Order dismissing the case. It is from this Order 
that the plaintiffs have taken this appeal. 
POINT I 
THE CITY HAD AUTHORITY TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE 
MAKING CONNECTION TO THE SEWER SYSTEM 
MANDATORY 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-15, 1953, as it read 
when the mandatory hook-up ordinance was adopted, read: 
"They may construct, maintain, and operate 
waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment 
systems, gas works, electric light works, telephone 
lines or public transportation systems, or authorize 
the construction, maintenance and operation of 
the same by others, or purchase or lease such 
works or systems from any person or corporation, 
and they may sell and deliver the surplus product 
or service capacity of any such works, not required 
by the city or its inhabitants to others beyond 
the limits of the city." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-38 read, in pertinent 
part, when the mandatory hook-up ordinance was adopted: 
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"Boards of commissioners, city councils 
and boards of trustees of cities and towns may 
construct, reconstruct, maintain and operate 
sewer systems, sewage treatment plants .... 
and all systems, equipment and facilities 
necessary to the proper drainage, sewage and 
sanitary sewage disposal requirements of the 
city or town and regulate the construction and 
use thereof. --
"Any city or town, for the purpose of 
defraying the cost of construction, reconstruction, 
maintenance or operation of any sewer system or 
sewage treatment plant, may make a reasonable 
charge for the use thereof." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, as in effect when 
the mandatory hook-up ordinance was adopted, read: 
"They may pass all ordinances and rules 
and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging 
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, 
and such as are necessary and proper to provide 
!or !he safety and ~reserve the health, and 
Eromote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace 
and good order, comfort and convenience.of the 
city and the inhabitants thereof, and for-t~ 
protectioncif property therein; and may enforce 
obedience to such ordinances with such fines 
or penalties as they may deem proper; provided, 
that the punishment of any offense shall be by 
fine in any sum less than $300.00 or by imprison-
ment not to exceed six months, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment." 
While it is true that Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-
8-38 was amended in 1971 to include language specifically 
authorizing cities to enact mandatory hook-up ordinances, it 
does not necessarily follow that cities lacked such authority 
prior to that time. Appellants cite Salt Lake City v. Towne 
House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P. 2d 442 (1967), 
as authority for the proposition that the 1971 amendment of 
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Section 10-8-38 means that cities did not have the power to 
adopt mandatory hook-up ordinances prior to that time. It is 
true that "the enactment of subsequent legislation containing 
a specific grant of power kindred to that contained in prior 
legislation containing a general grant of power usually 
suggests the conclusion that the later specific grant was 
not included within the former general grant". Salt Lake City 
v. Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 421, 424 P. 2d 
442, 445. But the suggestion of that conclusion does not 
compel the conclusion. It is also recognized that the 
passage of a statute expressly conferring power on a municipal 
corporation does not necessarily preclude the pre-existence 
of the power. Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 SE 139; 
overruled on other grounds, Irvine v. Clifton Forge, 124 Va. 
78, 97 SE 310. The Supreme Court of this state has recognized 
on two separate occasions the power of cities and counties 
to adopt mandatory hook-up ordinances. In Bigler, et al. v. 
Greenwood, et al., 123 Utah 60, 254 P. 2d 843 (1953), the 
Salt Lake County Commissioners had set up a sewer district, 
construction project and a plan for financing the same. The 
plaintiffs filed in the Supreme Court an original proceeding 
seeking an extraordinary writ to prohibit the commissioners 
from going forward with the program. One of the points the 
plaintiffs attacked the program on was that the method of 
financing would impose liens upon plaintiffs' property 
without notice and thus denied them due process of law. 
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This was the point the Court decided the case on. The 
Court, in making its determination as to whether the method 
of financing the project was a non-lien purely revenue bond 
financing or one which created a lien upon the property, 
noted that each householder within the district whose property 
was within 200 feet of the sewer was under mandate of a 
county ordinance to connect with the sewer. Speaking of 
this mandatory hook-up provision the Court said, "The ordinance 
is unquestionably valid and enforceable. The County Conunis-
sioners ... may make and enforce ... all such local. 
sanitary regulations as are not in conflict with general 
laws and. .make such provision for the preservation of 
health. . as they may deem necessary ... Such an ordinance 
is undeniably proposed to protect the health and welfare and 
is therefore a valid exerci'se of authority expressly conferred 
under the police power." Bigler, supra at 66-67. The 
statutes which the Court cited as giving the comnissioners 
µower to adopt such an ordinance were Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 17-5-35 and 49. These statues are similar in their 
provisions to Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, which is 
cormnonly known as the "General Welfare Clause" for cities. 
In Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah 2d 138, 307 
P. 2d 895 (1957), the City of Layton enacted an ordinance 
authorizing and directing the execution of a contract between 
the City and the North Davis County Sewer District. One 
provision of the contract required the City to keep in 
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force, at all times during the term of the contract, an 
ordinance requiring all buildings and structures in the City 
used for residential, commercial or industrial purposes and 
which were within a reasonable distance of an established 
sewer connection main, to be connected to such main. In 
speaking of this provision, the Court said, "There might be 
some difference of opinion on whether some buildings are 
within a reasonable distance from a sewer main, and a 
reasonable distance from such main might be different under 
some circumstances than under others, but it seems clear 
that the City's governing body should have no difficulty in 
enacting an ordinance which would fix a reasonable distance 
from such main within which all the buildings and structures 
designated in the contract must be connected with such 
main." Bair, supra at 149. 
It should also be noted that Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 10-8-38, as it existed at the time the city adopted 
its mandatory hook-up ordinance, granted the city the power 
to construct and to regulate the construction and use of the 
sewer system. The mandatory hook-up ordinance is a reasonable 
regulation which was adopted to help defray the cost of 
construction and maintenance and also to protect the health 
and safety and to promote the prosperity of the city and its 
inhabitants. 
In conclusion, the city had authority tmder the case law 
of this state and pursuant to its police power and power to 
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construct and regulate the construction and use of sewers 
within the city limits, to adopt a mandatory hook-up ordinance 
prior to the time when Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-38 
was amended in 1971 to expressly provide such power. The 
legislature in so amending that section was codifying and 
clarifying what was already recognized as the state of the 
law. 
POINT II 
THE BOND ELECTION WAS VALID IN THAT THERE 
WERE NO MISREPRESENTATIONS CALCULATED TO 
MISLEAD THE VOTERS 
In the case of Ricker, et al. v. Board of Education of 
Millard County School District, 16 Utah 2d 106, 396 P. 2d 
416 (1964), the defendant, School Board, had determined to 
have a school bond election. The Board published, in a 
local newspaper, a notice of the school bond election and a 
copy of the official ballot. In addition, it had printed an 
explanatory brochure about the election and its purpose. 
The brochure indicated, among other things, that the funds 
generated by the bonds would be spent under two main categories: 
high schools and elementary schools. The brochure indicated 
the main item in high schools would be a new combined junior 
and senior high school at Delta, at a cost of about $1,250,000.00 
and, additionally, that about $155,000.00 would be spent at 
Millard High School. It also indicated that there were 
several proposals under consideration for construction and 
remodeling of grade schools in the district but gave no cost 
estimates for those projects. 
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The bond election carried and the School Board proceeded 
to get a definite estimate as to the cost of the new school 
at Delta. It was discovered that the preliminary estimate 
for that project was too low and the actual cost would be 
$1,645,000.00 to $1,786,000.00. The maximum amount of bonds 
that the Board could issue, based on the 1964 assessed 
valuation, was $1,935,000.00. The plaintiffs brought suit 
to prevent the Board from going forward with a project of 
building the new school at Delta. The plaintiffs' contention 
was that the Board should not be allowed to use substantially 
all of the money for the high school projects, leaving only 
a small amount to meet the needs of the elementary schools. 
The plaintiffs contended that to do otherwise would be a 
violation of the condition upon which the public voted for 
the bonds and a breach of faith by the Board in performing 
their duties. The Board's position was that it was bound 
only by the statutory notice and not by the statements in 
the explanatory brochure and that if, in order for it to 
properly discharge its duties, it needed a free hand to 
spend the funds for the most pressing needs of the district 
which it felt were the high school projects. The District 
Court ruled that the Board should allocate the money raised 
by the bonds for the purposes stated in the brochure. The 
trial court added the sum of the high school project estimates 
from the brochure, added 10% and set that as the limit to be 
spent on those projects. The Supreme Court, on appeal, 
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identified the question presented as "whether the plaintiffs . 
. . can compel the defendant, Board, to use the money raised 
in the bond election only in the amounts stated and for the 
purposes specified in the brochure". Ricker, supra at 419. 
In answering this question, the Court said, "We do not 
disagree with the idea that public officials should not be 
allowed to make representations or publish materials deliberately 
calculated to mislead the voters, and then escape responsibility 
for their commitments with the excuse that such representations 
were not part of the official notice". Ricker, infra at 
418. The Court noted that the District Court concluded that 
the representations were not made with intent to deceive or 
mislead and that its publication did not constitute any 
misrepresentation. The Court further stated on this point: 
"It is also true that if i·t were shown that there existed 
~ ~ ~~ ~~- -~- -~~ 
some actual deceit, fraud or corruption; or if the board was 
acting outside the scope of its authority, or was so completely 
failing to follow the course of its duties that its actions 
could be classified as capricious or arbitrary, redress 
might be had in the courts". The Court concluded that the 
Board's conduct could not be so classified and that the 
proposed building could not be properly interferred with and 
vacated the District Court's order. 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs allege that the 
elected officials of Grantsville City made certain representa-
tions, both oral and written, in order to facilitate the 
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passage of the bond election and that the plaintiffs relied 
upon said representations in supporting the bond issue. No-
where is it alleged that the representations were deliberatelj_ 
calculated to mislead or that there existed some actual 
deceit, fraud or corruption. There is no evidence in the 
record that there was any intent to deceive the plaintiffs 
or any other voters with respect to the facts. With respect 
to the written and oral representations alleged, the only 
evidence introduced and before the trial court was Fxhibit 
P-3. There is no evidence in the record as to any oral 
representations by any city official. Plaintiffs have 
alleged the following representations: "(1) The charge for 
a resident to hook-up to the system would not exceed $250.00, 
(2) Residents with existing and acceptable septic tank 
systems would not be required to connect to the sewer system, 
and (3) A monthly service charge would be assessed only to 
those residents utilizing the sewer system. Residents not 
connected would not be charged". Complaint, paragraph 5. A 
reading of Exhibit P-3 reveals the following: (1) T •.Jith 
respect to the first allegation, the exhibit reads "Connection 1 
Charge at $250.00. .$170,000" indicating the amount antici-
pated to be raised by the connection charge. Nowhere does 
it state that the connection charge would not exceed $250.00. 
Indeed, the fourth paragraph of the exhibit reads as follows: 
"It is the best estimates (emphasis added) of the mayor and 
city council, engineers and financial consultants that the 
-14-
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-essential facts of the project are as set out in the following 
discussion." The representation complained of is included 
in that following discussion; (2) There is no representation 
that residents with existing and acceptable septic tank 
systems would not be required to connect to the sewer system; 
(3) The brochure did state that a monthly service charge 
would be charged to all persons using the system and people 
not connected will not be charged. 
The trial court, based upon the evidence produced, made 
the following findings: 
"The plaintiffs did not support the bond election." 
"That Exhibit P-3 did not misrepresent the facts related 
to construction of the sewer system." Findings of Fact, 
page 4. 
In this action the plaintiffs are seeking equitable 
relief in the form of a permanent injunction enjoining the 
respondent from enforcing certain sections of the Revised 
Ordinances of Grantsville City. The rule, as to matters of 
fact in a case in equity, is that the Supreme Court may 
review questions of fact as well as questions of law but 
that the Findings of Fact will not be disturbed unless the 
clear weight of the evidence is against them. Peterson v. 
Carter, 579 P. 2d 329; Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P. 2d 430; 
Merrill v. Bailey and Sons, 99 Utah 323, 106 P. 2d 255. The 
weight evidence does not preponderate against the findings 
of the trial judge in this matter. To the contrary, there 
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is no evidence of any fraud or deceit or publication of 
material deliberately calculated to mislead the plaintiffs 
or any other voters. The only evidence as to any conduct on 
the part of any of the plaintiffs with respect to the 
representations in Exhibit P-3 is the testimony of Mr. Fidler. 
Mr. Fidler testified that he received a copy of Exhibit P-3. 
Transcript, page 16, lines 21-28. He was asked if he relied 
on the information as being true and replied, "Yes". 
Transcript, page 18, lines 1-5. He then testified that he 
did not vote for the bond election. Transcript, page 19, 
lines 5-7. Mr. Fidler cannot therefore claim to have relied 
to his detriment in supporting the bond issue, since he did 
not support it. There is no evidence in the record that any 
of the other plaintiffs or any other citizens relied upon 
Exhibit P-3. Further, Exhibit P-3 does not, as has already 
been pointed out, misrepresent the facts. It states by its 
own terms that it is the "best estimate" of those involved 
in planning the sewer project. 
One further point must be raised here. The Appellants 
seek an injunction against increasing the connection fee 
above $250.00 as against them. Each of them has paid the 
$350.00 connection fee for each of the premises for which 
they were responsible to pay. The payments were not made 
under protest, even if their counsel advised them to so pay 
the fees. The basis for seeking the injunction against 
charging the Appellants more than $250.00 for the connection 
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fee, is that it is contrary to the representations made 
which Appellants allegedly relied upon. This is in effect 
. 
an effort to recover $100.00 from the Respondent, City for 
each connection fee paid, based upon a theory of misrepresenta-
tion. This type of action sounds in tort, specifically the 
tort of deceit. For this type of action, the city has immunity 
under Utah Code Annotated, Section 60-30-1, et seq. Rapp v. 
Salt Lake City, 527 P. 2d 651 (1974). The city raised this 
defense in a timely manner. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAW HAS NOT BEEN VIOLATED 
Municipal ordinances adopted under state authority 
constitute state action and therefore are within the coverage 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 
44, 82 L.Ed. 949, 48 S.Ct. 666 (1938). This is not a case 
involving a "suspect class" calling for "strict judicial 
scrutiny" and a showing of a "compelling state interest". 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 98 L.Ed. 884, 74 S.Ct. 693 
(1954). Rather the test to be applied here in determining 
whether the city's conduct violates Appellants' rights to 
equal protection of the laws is whether the distinctions 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate objective 
sought to be accomplished. Foley v. Connelie, 55 L.Ed. 2d 
287, 98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978). In this case, the Appellants 
only witness, Mr. Fidler, testified that the houses on the 
South side of Main Street to the Tooele Junction, except 
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two, are not connected to the sewer. Transcript, page 15. 
It was proferred and stipulated that Jay Frank Bonell, a 
professional engineer, whose firm designed the system, would 
testify that all persons who could connect to the sewer 
system were connected, except for two. That some residences 
are not connected because of the cost of running the lines 
to outlying areas of the city and that some are not connected 
because the level of the main sewer line is higher than the 
level of their basement and they could not connect without 
installing a pump. Transcript, pages 41-42. Not compelling 
persons to connect and not extending the sewer lines for 
such reasons is certainly not arbitrary and capricious and 
does bear a rational relationship to the objective to be 
accomplished. It is submitted, therefore, that the Appellants' 
right to equal protection of the law has not been denied. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE NOT 
BEEN VIOLATED 
Appellants claim that their constitutional rights to 
due process were violated because the city caused their 
water service to be turned off when they failed to pay their 
connection fees. The only evidence before the Court is that 
Mr. Fidler's water service was terminated when he failed to 
pay the connection fee. That he paid the connection fee 
without paying it under protest and water service was restored. 
Their is no evidence that any other person's water service 
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was terminated. The evidence also shows that several letters 
were sent to those who had not paid the connection fee, 
including one which notifies the receiver that it is to be 
deemed a final notice. 
Appellants cite Koger v. Guarino, 412 F.Supp. 1375, as 
authority for the proposition that the city cannot terminate 
their water service without first having a hearing. The 
case is not directly on point with the instant case and can 
be distinguished in several ways. First, that case dealt 
with terminating water service for non-payment of disputed 
service charges. This case involves a one time connection 
fee and not a dispute over periodic service charges. Second, 
in this case the Appellants did not contend that they had 
been billed in excess of what the ordinance permitted. Nor 
did they contend that they had not received credit for what 
they had paid. The Appellants admit that they did not pay 
the connection fee. There would have been no purpose in 
having a hearing to adjust a charge when there was no dispute 
as to how much the Appellants had paid or as to how much the 
ordinance provided for th.e connection fee to be. The only 
dispute was whether or not the city could enforce the mandatory 
hook-up provision of the ordinance and collect $350.00 
rather than $250.00 for the connection fee. These matters 
could not be resolved in an informal hearing designed to 
settle disputed service charges because the resolution of 
those questions involve determination of questions of law 
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calling for exercise of strictly judicial functions. Shea 
v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 209, 212, 120 P. 2d 274. 
Payment under protest and following the statutory procedure 
therefore was Appellants' remedy. Therefore, any hearing 
would have been nothing more than an exercise in futility. 
It should also be noted that Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 10-8-38, as it existed when the city adopted the 
mandatory hook-up ordinance, permitted cities to terminate 
water service for non-payment of charges to the premises 
served by the water. It was pursuant to this statutory 
authority and the ordinance that Appellant, Wilton Fidler's 
water service was terminated. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS CANNOT RECOVER THEIR CONNECTION 
FEES BECAUSE SAID FEES WERE NOT PAID UNDER 
PROTEST AND THE APPELLANTS DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT OR UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 10-7-77 
Appellants claim that they are entitled to a refund of 
the moneys which they paid for connection fees regardless of 
whether such fees were paid under protest. As authority for 
this proposition they cite Wilson v. Weber County, 100 Utah 
141, 111 P. 2d 147 (1941). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-11-11, as in effect 
when the Appellants paid their fees read: 
"In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, 
or other demands for tublic revenue (emphasis added) 
wnich is deemed unlaw ul by the party whose property 
is thus taxed, or from whom such tax or license 
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is demanded or enforced, such party may pay 
under protest such tax or license, or any 
part thereof deemed tmlawful, to the officers 
designated and authorized by law to collect 
the same; and thereupon the party so paying 
or his legal representative may bring an 
action in any court of competent jurisdiction 
against the officer to whom said tax or license 
was paid, or against the state, cotmty, 
mtmicipality or other taxing tmit or whose 
behalf the same was collected, to recover said 
tax or license or any portion thereof paid 
under protest." 
The Appellants connection fee was a "demand for public 
revenue" within the meaning of this statute and to recover 
the same Appellants must pay tmder protest. Wilson v. 
Weber County, which Appellants claim relieves them of the 
responsibility of paying tmder protest, was overruled in 
Shea v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 209, 120 P. 2d 274, 
where this court said, in speaking of the Wilson case, "That 
case must be considered as overruled to the extent that 
anything said in that opinion may be said to hold that a 
tax, license or other exaction for public revenue (emphasis 
added), not paid under protest, may be recovered because 
collected tmder a statute subsequently held invalid." Shea, 
supra at 213. The Court also stated at page 212 of that 
opinion, "In cases in which legality or illegality of t:ax 
sought to be recovered by taxpayer necessarily involves 
determination of questions of law calling for exercise of 
strictly judicial functions, payment under protest and 
compliance with other provisions of the statutes afford the 
exclusive remedy". 
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Further it should be noted that not only did the 
Appellants not pay the connection fee under protest, but 
they also failed to comply with the Governmental Immunity 
Act and Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-7-77 by timely 
presenting their claim to the city. 
CONCLUSION 
The case law of this state is clear that the Respondent, 
City, had authority to adopt a mandatory hook-up ordinance 
pursuant to its police powers. Such authority is also 
implied in the power of the city to construct and regulate 
sewers within the city limits. 
The city's enforcement of the challenged ordinances has 
not been arbitrary and capricious. To the contrary, there 
is a rational reason for not requiring those few premises 
not connected to the sewer to connect and for not extending 
the lines to those areas not presently served by the sewer 
system. 
The Respondent, City and its elected officials did not 
misrepresent the facts about the sewer system or its cost to 
the residents of Grantsville. The brochure which Appellants 
complain of by its own words describes the contents thereof 
as the "best estimates" of those involved in planning the 
project. It was a mistake which was not discovered until 
after construction of the sewer system was well under way 
which occasioned the increase in the connection fee. 
Furthennore, the Appellants' own evidence demonstrates that 
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they did not rely on the brochure in supporting the bond 
election. There is no evidence at all of any deceit, fraud 
or corruption calculated to mislead the voters on the part 
of any city official. 
The Appellants claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional 
in that it allows for termination of water service without a 
prior hearing. The case Appellants cite in support of this 
contention is distinguishable from the facts in the instant 
case in several respects which have been discussed. Further, 
such termination is expressly authorized by state law. 
The Appellants did not pay this "demand for public 
revenue" under protest which is a prerequisite to bringing 
an action to recover the same. Further, the Appellants did 
not follow the statutory procedure for presenting their 
claim to the city and did not file this lawsuit in a timely 
manner. 
The decision of the trial court, in this case, is 
supported by the evidence and the law and should therefore 
be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7~day of July, 1979. 
~~ 
Attorney for Respondents 
Attorney for Respondents 
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